Abstract-We study the secure degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) of the MISO compound wiretap channel. The transmitter has M antennas, whereas the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper each have one antenna and the channel vectors take one of finitely many values. If the number of states of either the legitimate receiver or the eavesdropper channel is less than M , then then we achieve full 1 d.o.f. If however the number of states of both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper channel are at-least equal to M , then we establish that the d.o.f. is strictly less than 1. Our upper bound is, to our knowledge, the first bound which is strictly tighter than the "pairwise upper bound". Lower bounds that combine ideas based on time-sharing, noise transmission, signal alignment and multi-level coding schemes are also provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel, introduced in [1] is an information theoretic model for secure communications at the physical layer. In this model, there are three terminals -a sender, a receiver and an eavesdropper. A wiretap code simultaneously ensures reliable communication to the legitimate receiver and secrecy with respect to the eavesdropper. In recent times that has been a significant interest in applying this model to wireless communication systems. Some recent works include secure communications over fading channels [2] - [4] , multi-antenna wiretap channels [5] - [13] and several multiuser channels.
The wiretap channel model assumes that the eavesdropper's channel statistics are known to all the terminals. As one justification, when the receiver channels are degraded, the wiretap code can be designed for the worst-case eavesdropper in a class. However in many cases of practical interest, such as in the case of multiantenna channels, the receivers cannot be ordered in this fashion and it is not possible to characterize the worst-case eavesdropper.
A model that incorporates the lack of knowledge of the receiver channels is a compound extension of the wiretap channel. In the model studied in [14] the channels of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper take one of finitely many values. The problem is equivalent to broadcasting a common message to multiple intended receivers while keeping the message secure against a collection of non-colluding eavesdroppers. A lower bound on the secrecy capacity is established which amounts to sending information at a rate such that that the worst legitimate receiver can decode while every eavesdropper channel remains in (asymptotically) perfect equivocation. One immediate upper bound to capacity is the pairwise upper bound. This bound essentially (c.f. (51)) considers all possible receiver-eavesdropper pairs and selects the pair with smallest capacity assuming all other receivers are absent. This bound coincides with the coding scheme in [14] when the underlying channels are deterministic and the legitimate receiver has only one realization. The pairwise upper bound is also tight for parallel reversely degraded wiretap channels when there is one legitimate receiver and multiple eavesdroppers [3] , [15] or when there are multiple receivers and one eavesdropper [2] . Other recent works on the compound wiretap channel include [16] , [17] .
To the best of our knowledge, no upper bounds besides the pairwise upper bound are known for the compound wiretap channel. All the conclusive capacity results previously used the pairwise upper bound in the converse and proposed coding schemes that attain it. In this paper we study the multi-input-single-output (MISO) wiretap channel, where both the legitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers channel take one of finitely many values. We develop a new upper bound on secrecy-rate that is tighter than the pairwise upper bound and establishes that there is a loss in degrees of freedom due to uncertainty of channel state information at the transmitter. In addition we provide lower bounds based on time-sharing and noise transmission strategies and show that in some special cases these bounds can be further improved using signal alignment and multilevel coding strategies. While our analysis is restricted to the MISO wiretap channel, we expect techniques developed in deriving upper and lower bounds to be applicable to related problems such as the compund extension of the MIMO wiretap channel, the two receiver broadcast channel with mutually confidential messages [9] and the multi-receiver broadcast channel with an external wiretapper [12] , [13] . We note that recently signal and interference alignment schemes have been used in the wiretap channel literature in e.g. [18] - [20] . Secure degrees of freedom for the compound wiretap channel are studied previously in [14] . The expressions involve optimizing over certain subspaces defined by the channel vectors and do not take into account techniques such as time-sharing, signal alignment or multi-level coding.
In the remainder of the paper, section II introduces the channel model, section III considers the cases when there is no loss in degrees of freedom due to channel uncertainty, section IV provides lower bounds on achievable degrees of freedom whereas section V establishes an upper bound on the secure degrees of freedom.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
The model includes one transmitter with M antennas, one receiver and one eavesdropper, each with one antenna. The channels of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are given by,
where t denotes the time index, y and z denote the channel output symbols at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper respectively whereas h, g ∈ R
M
denote the corresponding channel matrices of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper respectively. The additive noise variables are independent (across users and time) and Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance. We assume an average power constraint on the input i. We further assume that the channels matrices of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper belong of a finite set i.e.,
Unless we explicitly state otherwise, we assume that H and G are such that any combination of M vectors taken from either of the sets are linearly independent. This assumption is satisfied for example if the channel vectors are sampled from any continuous distribution. The actual realization of h and g is known to the respective receivers whereas only the sets H and G are known to the remaining terminals. We use the notation y j to denote the output at the receiver when h = h j for j = 1, 2, . . . , J r . Similarly the notation z j denotes the output at the eavesdropper when g = g j for j = 1, 2, . . . , J e . Note that the compound wiretap channel is equivalent to another scenario where there are a total of J r legitimate receivers, each interested in a common message and J e non-colluding eavesdroppers. The channel output of the jth legitimate receiver is denoted by y j while that of the jth eavesdropper is denoted by z j . We often use the term user to denote a particular state of the receiver.
We will also use the notation where the transmit vectors and received symbols are concatenated together i.e., X = [x(1), . . . , x(n)] and likewise
In this notation the channel (1) can be expressed as
A compound wiretap encoder maps a message m, uniformly distributed over a set of size 2 nR , to the channel input sequence x n . The decoder produces a message estimatem j = g j (y n j ; h j ). A rate R is achievable if there exist a sequence of encoder and decoders of such that Pr(m =m j ) → 0 as n → ∞ for each j = 1, 2, . . . , J r and
The largest rate achievable under these constraints is the compound secrecy capacity. Of particular interest is the degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) of the compound wiretap channel. We say that d d.o.f. are achievable on the compound wiretap channel, if there exists a sequence of achievable rates R(P ), indexed by power P , such that
The maximum attainable value of d is the secrecy d.o.f. of the compound wiretap channel.
III. CASES WHEN d = 1
It is clear that even in absence of secrecy constraints we can at-most attain 1 d.o.f. In this section we observe that when min(J r , J e ) ≤ 1, it is indeed possible to attain 1 d.o.f. We first consider the case when J r ≤ M Proposition 1: When J r < M the compound MISO wiretap channel achieves full 1 degree of freedom.
Proof: When the number of legitimate receiver channel states is less than M the matrix H r = [h 1 , . . . , h Jr ] is a low rank matrix. We can construct A ∈ R M −Jr×M whose rows are mutually orthogonal as well as orthogonal to the columns of H r i.e., A · H r = 0. Furthermore, since every eavesdropper channel state g j is linearly independent of the columns of H r , we have that Ag j = 0, since the rank of [h 1 , . . . , h Jr , g j ] exceeds J r . As described below, by transmitting noise symbols along the rows of the A matrix we can thus ensure that the legtimate receiver's mutual information scales as 1 2 log 2 P while the eavesdropper's mutual information does not increase at this rate.
Let u be any unit norm vector such that h T i u = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , J r . The transmitted vector is:
where s ∼ N (0, P 0 ) is the information bearing symbol, where n ∼ N (0, P 0 I M −Jr ) is a vector of noise symbols transmitted in the common null-space of user matrices and where P 0 = P M is selected to meet the transmit power constraint. Accordingly the received signals can be expressed as,
and
An achievable secrecy rate is given by [14] 
which scales like 1 2 log P since ||Ag j || > 0 for each j = 1, 2, . . . , J e and h T i u > 0 for i = 1, . . . , J r . When there are fewer than M eavesdropping channels and an arbitrary number of legitimate receiver channels we still achieve one d.o.f. by transmitting information in the common null-space of the eavesdropper channels.
Proposition 2: When J e < M the compound MISO wiretap channel achieves 1 d.o.f.
Proof:
is a low-rank matrix when J e < M hence we construct a matrix B ∈ R M −Je×M with orthogonal rows such that B · G = 0. Further because each h i is linearly independent of the columns of G, it must have a component in the null space i.e., Bh i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , J r . The transmitted vector is
where the information vector m ∼ N(0, P 1 I) is a vector of i.i.d Gaussian symbols and P 1 = P M . Since any information transmitted along rows of B will not be seen by any eavesdropper, the resulting achievable rate is:
= min
which scales as
The lower bound in Prop. 3 is based on selecting a subset of receivers to serve or a subset of eavesdroppers to hide the message against and time-sharing between the choice of these subsets. It extends the techniques in Prop. 1 and Prop. 2 to the case when min(J r , J e ) ≥ M .
Proposition 3: The following degrees of freedom are achievable for the compound MISO wiretap channel when min(J r , J e ) ≥ M :
Proof: We first sketch how one achieves 
and where Θ is a sufficiently large constant, (which will be specified later) that does not grow with P . The message is mapped into a codeword of a (T, 
It remains to show how to transmit message m t such that each user in a subset S t decodes it with high probability while satisfying I(m t ; z j ) ≤ nε n . 3) Each subset S t is served over n channel uses.
The message m t is transmitted to M − 1 users belonging to this subset along the lines of Prop. 1 i.e., by transmitting information symbols in the common range space and noise in the common null space of these users (c.f. (5))
where a t and u t are unit norm vectors such that h T i u t = 0 and h T i a t = 0 for each i ∈ S t and s and n are information bearing and noise symbols respectively. Following the analysis leading to (11) we can see that the following rate is achievable:
where Θ t is a constant that does not scale with P . Furthermore we let Θ in (16) to be 
and Ω is a sufficiently large constant that will be specified later. Each eavesdropper is absent on a total of T where s is the information bearing symbol. Since each vector h i is linearly independent of any collection of M −1 eavesdropper channel vectors it follows that h T i b t = 0, and one can achieve a rate
where
With this choice of Ω, each receiver decodes each of the messages m 1 , . . . , m T with high probability. Furthermore, each of the eavesdropper does not have access to T 1 sub-messages corresponding to the subsets S t to which it belongs. By virtue of our code construction, this ensures that I(m; z j ) ≤ nε n . The overall achievable rate is given by R = T e 1 T e R 1 and hence the achievable degrees of freedom are given by
The time-sharing schemes in Prop. 3 can be further improved using a variety of signal alignment schemes. In our results below we assume that all the channel in (1) are drawn by sampling a continuous distribution and remain fixed thereafter.
1) Signal Alignment: Proposition 4:
Consider a compound MISO wiretap channel with M = 2 transmit antennas and J r = 3 states and J e ≥ 3. By aligning the signals of legitimate receivers in a lower dimensional subspace, one can achieve up to 1/2 degrees of freedom (almost surely).
Remark 1: We note that the time-sharing approach in Prop. 3 achieves 1/3 d.o.f Thus the signal alignment scheme can strictly improve the secrecy rate.
Proof: The suggested scheme involves coding over an extension of two symbols. The channel matrices over this extension are given by
and the corresponding received symbols, taken two at a time, are expressed as
where y i and z j are length-two received vectors at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper respectively, the input x ∈ R 4 is a length four vector and v i and w j are length-two noise vectors. The basic idea is to force each receiver to receive signal in a one dimensional subspace by post multiplying the received symbols with a length 2 vector i.e.,
Signal alignment is used to select the vectors r 1 , r 2 , r 3 in such a way that
This can be accomplished for example by letting r 3 to be an arbitrary length 2 vector and selecting r 1 and r 2 as follows:
By virtue of (27) we have that
and hence there exist a two dimensional space defined by the matrix B ∈ R 4×2 such thatH · B = 0. The proposed scheme sends noise along this subspace. Since the channel vectors g j are sampled independently of h i , we have that almost surely
where we have introduced
Furthermore, let t be a vector such that r T i H i t = 0 then the transmitted vector is of the form:
where s ∼ N (0, P 3 ) is the information bearing symbol whereas n ∼ N (0, P 3 I 2 ) is a vector of noise symbols. The received symbols at the legitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers are given as:
An achievable rate for the compound wiretap channel is [14] 
where the factor of 1/2 appears because we are aggregating two symbols to send each information symbol. Our claim is complete once we show that
To establish (34) note that
from which (34) follows since by construction r
To show that (37) does not scale with P , we let G j B = U j Λ j V † j be the singular value decomposition of G j B where U j and V j are unitary matrices and Λ j is a 2 × 2 diagonal matrix. Since G j B is full rank
where we introduce t
Since λ c > 0, this shows that I(s; z j ) = Θ(1) as required.
2) Multi-level coding : In the previous section we observed how one can leverage on interference alignment to improve the achievable degrees of freedom compared to time-sharing. In the following section we show how another technique, multi-level coding can also improve achievable degrees of freedom. We will restrict our attention to a specific example where
To get insights into the multi-level coding scheme, we first consider a simple example of deterministic channels over F 3 .
Proposition 5: Consider a linear deterministic channel over F 3 with two input symbols x 1 and x 2 and with output symbols described as follows:
where the addition and subtraction is defined over the group in F 3 . Then we can achieve a secrecy rate of R = 1 b/s for this channel.
Remark 2:
We note that a time-sharing based rate, analogous to Prop. 3, achieves a rate of 1 2 log 2 3 = 0.792 b/s. Thus the proposed rate is significantly higher than time-sharing. In the Gaussian example, a natural extension of this scheme yields significantly higher degrees of freedom than time-sharing.
Proof: The key idea behind the proof is to enable the legitimate receivers to take advantage of the field F 3 in decoding while we limit the observation of the eavesdroppers to binary valued symbols. The wiretap code is illustrated below:
When message bit 0 needs to be transmitted the sender selects one of the two tuples (0, 0) and (1, 1) at random and transmit the corresponding value of (x 1 , x 2 ). Likewise when bit 1 needs to be transmitted one of the two tuples (0, 1) and (1, 0) will be transmitted.
Note that when b = 0 is transmitted y 1 ∈ {0, 2} while y 2 = 0 whereas when b = 1 we have that y 1 = 1 and y 2 ∈ {1, 2}. It can be readily verified that each receiver is able to recover either message. Assuming that the messages are equally likely, it can also be readily verified that the message bit is independent of both x 1 and x 2 and thus the secrecy condition w.r.t. each eavesdropper is satisfied. To generalize the above coding scheme to the Gaussian case we consider a natural multi-level extension. Fix integers T and M with the following properties: T is the smallest integer such that for a given ε > 0, Pr(max i∈{1,2} |v i | ≥ 3 T −1 ) ≤ ε and M is the largest integer such that 3 2M ≤ P/2. We now construct a multi-level code with a rate of M − T information bits and error probability at-most ε.
Let the information bits be represented by the vector b = (b T , . . . , b M −1 ) . For each i ∈ {T, . . . , M − 1}, we map the bit b i ∈ {0, 1} into symbols (x 1 (i),x 2 (i)) according to the code construction in (41). The transmitted symbols are given by
and the received symbols at the two receivers can be expressed as,
(43) where we have introducedỹ 1 (l) =x 1 (l) +x 2 (l) and
With the choice of M , it follows that E[||x|| 2 ] ≤ P . Furthermore in the analysis of decoding, we declare an error if max i |v i | > 3 T −1 . Conditioned on the fact that the |v i | < 3 T −1 for i = 1, 2 note that
where we have used the fact that
in the summation is an integer multiple of 3 T . Thus conditioned on the fact that |v i | < 3 T −1 it is possible to retrieve
l by computing (44). Since there is no carry over across levels we in turn retrieve (ỹ i (T ), . . . ,ỹ i (M )) at each receiver. Then applying the same decoding scheme as in Prop. 5 at each level, each receiver can recover the underlying bits (b T , . . . , b M ). If however we have that |v i | ≥ 3
T −1 , then the above analysis leading to (46) fails and an error is declared. Since T is selected to be sufficiently large, this event happens with a probability that is less than ε.
In order to complete the analysis it remains to show that H(b|z i ) = M − T . We first enhance each eavesdropper by removing the noise variable in (40) i.e.,z j = x j for j = 1, 2. Now consider
where the last relation follows from H(b l |x i (l)) = 1 since we use the code construction in (41) in mapping
The resulting d.o.f. achieved by the multi-level code is given by
We summarize the performance of the multi-level coding scheme below. Theorem 1: Consider a compound MISO wiretap channel, provided that the channel states satisfy min(J r , J e ) ≥ M , the secure degrees of freedom are upper bounded by
We make a few remarks. Note that an immediate upper bound on the compound wiretap channel is the pairwise upper bound. This says that the capacity is upper bounded by 
Intuitively this bound amounts to considering the upper bound between each receiver-eavesdropper pair and minimizing among all such pairs. To the best of our knowledge this upper bound is the only bound known for the compound wiretap channel and has been shown to be tight in some special cases [2] , [14] , [15] . However for the MISO wiretap channel it can be easily 
however it can easily be verified that this potentially tighter bound also yields 1 d.o.f. To get a tighter bound in Thm. 1 we start from first principles and carefully combine the constraints imposed by the secrecy requirements and the common message transmission. The proof of the upper bound will be presented in the full paper.
